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Abstract 
The article examines the dialogue between the Global Unions, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund which was formalized in 2002 and was originally initiated by the 
Global Unions. The dialogue takes place at three levels: headquarters; sector; and country-
level. The Global Unions try to use the dialogue to persuade the International Financial 
Institutions to change their policies to promote and integrate a stronger social component 
within the system of global governance. The article focuses on the headquarters-level 
dialogue and examines some of the factors which promote and hinder the success of the 
dialogue from the perspective of the Global Unions.  
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The Global Unions and Global Governance: Analysing the Dialogue between the 
International Trade Union Organizations and the International Financial Institutions  
 
Introduction 
It has been argued that the existing system of global economic governance undermines worker’s 
rights, worker’s conditions and the trade unions that try to defend their interests, with some 
commentators suggesting that the system needs to be reformed to take labour’s interests 
properly into account (Turner, 2004). Globalization has arguably increased the complexity and 
interdependencies of actors in employment relations. However, the lack of research suggest that 
we need more evidence regarding these interaction processes on a global level. 
Despite the fact that reports published by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) argue that countries that have strong trade union and collective bargaining systems 
tend to have more resilient economies (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002) and that higher unionization 
and minimum wages can help reduce inequality (Jaumotte and Buitron, 2015), little attention 
has been paid to trade unions in the global system of economic governance, in particular their 
regulatory function and their potential contribution to a more socially orientated system (Koch-
Baumgarten, 2006).  
 
Although it is not widely known, international and national trade union organizations (as 
recognized actors in global civil society) have since 2002 taken part in a formalized ‘dialogue’ 
with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs); that is the World Bank Group and the IMF. 
This ‘dialogue’ is an important tool for trade unions as it allows them to raise awareness of 
organizational representatives in the IFIs regards labour issues. This includes for example the 
implementation and monitoring of International Labour Organization (ILO) labour standards 
and a better understanding of the role and importance of collective bargaining as a labour market 
institution.  
 
This article has two objectives. First, it aims to shed light on this specific type of international 
policy dialogue which as yet has received no serious attention in the literature. It is argued that 
the dialogue with the IFIs can be seen as a strategic instrument for the Global Unions to exercise 
influence over the policy of the IFIs and to shape the rules and institutions of global governance 
towards a more worker-friendly regime. In this context the article contributes in particular to 
the literature on transnational unionism and the impact of the Global Unions within global 
governance. 
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The second objective is to present an analysis of some of the factors which promote and hinder 
the dialogue and its potential as a means to integrate a social dimension into global governance. 
It is argued that due to its specific characteristics (structure, actors, and frequency of meetings), 
the dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs differs substantially from social dialogue 
(as defined by the European Union and the ILO) or lobbying. Furthermore, even though the 
interlocutors of the dialogue are international organizations, they are very different in terms of 
their organizational characteristics, such as their organizational structures, culture, identity and 
their resources. These characteristics, which have an impact on the perceptions and decision-
making of individual organizational representatives are analyzed through the lens of 
organizational theories. The article does not suggest that the Global Unions are able to revise 
and reshape the existing democratic deficit in the international policy arena on their own, but 
that trade unions are important interlocutors and, that the dialogue makes an important 
contribution in addressing the growing regulatory gap within the global system of governance. 
 
The IFIs are key players in the global governance system. These inter-governmental 
organizations act as ‘agents of global change’ and, through their lending to national 
governments and the conditions they attach to such loans, they have played an important role 
in governing the international economy since the post-World War II period (Carbone, 2007: 
180). In particular the IMF has often attempted to shape the governance of work and 
employment within nation states by imposing labour related conditions to its loans (Marginson, 
2016). By contrast the Global Unions are non-governmental organizations whose members are 
trade union organizations. They include the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), 
the nine Global Union Federations (GUFs) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the 
OECD (TUAC) (White, 2006).  
 
The dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs was formalized in 2002. There had been 
exchanges of information on a non-regular basis before then, but these exchanges had no formal 
structure and were often prompted by the potential outcomes of a number of structural 
adjustment programmes initiated by the IFIs. The main aim of the Global Unions within the 
dialogue is to persuade the IFIs to commit to a more socially-orientated global policy including 
the recognition of workers’ interests and rights in their development programmes and the 
conditions attached to their loans. In this context, the integration and consideration of core 
labour standards in the WB, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and IMF operations 
and their implementation has been a major issue for the Global Unions since the beginning of 
the dialogue. The dialogue takes place at three different levels: the headquarters (HQ)-level, the 
sector-level and the national-level. The paper focuses on the HQ dialogue as it is not within the 
scope of this paper to discuss the dialogue at all three levels. The HQ dialogue covers economic 
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and social issues concerning workers worldwide as well as the specific policy approaches 
followed by the IFIs.  
 
Research methods 
The data derives from an on-going qualitative research project based on a combination of semi-
structured expert interviews, non-participant observation and a content analysis of documentary 
materials (using QDA-Software (MAX-QDA). The latter includes the minutes of the 
headquarters-level dialogue, documents relating to the annual meetings of the IFIs and 
statements and working papers published by the IFIs and the Global Unions. This kind of 
triangulation allows the researcher to adopt ‘different perspectives on an issue under study’ 
(Flick, 2014: 184) and helps to extend the possibilities of knowledge production.  
 
The study is based on a total of 48 semi-structured expert interviews which were conducted 
between 2008 - 2011 and 2014 - 2017 with representatives from all major international 
organizations involved in the dialogue. The expert interviews with organizational 
representatives form the main information basis for paper, providing insights about the 
organizational culture of the organizations and existing perceptions regards the dialogue and 
social reality. The problem-centred approach to interviewing offered the possibility to reveal 
complex mediation processes of action and evaluation patterns around the dialogue, putting the 
emphasis on the perceptions of the interviewees. A semi-structured interview schedule was used 
which included no predefined answers.  
 
During the first phase (2008-2011) 32 interviews were conducted with representatives from all 
major international organizations involved in the dialogue. 18 of these interviews were 
conducted with senior union officials mainly General Secretaries and Deputy General 
Secretaries, from the Global Unions Federations (GUFs), the ITUC and the Trade Union 
Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC) as well as the German IG Metall union and the 
German Trade Union Confederation (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund - DGB). Nine interviews 
were conducted with staff from the WB and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
(including responsible staff for relationships with civil society, economists and procurement 
specialists) and the IMF (staff from Public Affairs and the Independent Evaluation Office). Five 
members of staff were also interviewed at the ILO and included advisers on rights at work, 
specialists on multinational enterprises (MNEs) as well as social policy staff from the ILO 
office in Washington. The second phase of follow-up interviews between 2014 and 2017 were 
conducted with staff from the ITUC, the Building and Woodworkers International (BWI), the 
WB, the IMF and the ILO. 
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The interviews were on average between 40 and 60 minutes in length and were conducted at 
the headquarters of the organisations in Washington D.C., Geneva, London, Brussels and 
Berlin. In addition, some interviews were carried out during the high-level meetings between 
the global trade union organizations and the IFIs in 2009 and in 2017 at the IMF both in 
Washington D.C.. Contacts with interviewees were made directly with the help from the 
ITUC/Global Unions office in Washington and there was no random selection from an expert 
register. Some of the contacts came about from respondents who had already been interviewed 
(snowballing). All of those interviewed have been involved in the dialogue with the IFIs. All 
interviews have been recorded and transcribed. The author is bilingual and was able to conduct 
the interviews in German (2 interviews) and English (46).   
 
The data was organized with the help of a QDA-Software (MAX-QDA) and analysed using 
‘thematic analysis’ which is a method for ‘identifying, analysing, and interpreting patterns of 
meaning (‘themes’) within qualitative data’ (Clarke and Braun, 2017: 297). The analysis of the 
data aimed to reveal the ideas and views of participants which related to the analytical interests 
of the researcher, in other words the data was analysed with specific questions in mind. After 
reading through the transcripts several times, initial codes were retrieved from the data. In this 
context, the analysis focused on the views of individual participants in an attempt to identify 
commonalities and differences across the organizations which are involved in the dialogue. The 
software facilitated this process by offering the possibility to colour important text passages 
and writing notes on the text. The different codes were combined, when possible, into 
overarching themes whereby some codes were linked to different themes. For example, the 
theme ‘impact of organizational structure’ is based on codes referring to ‘bureaucracy and 
democracy’, the ‘allocation and distribution of competencies’, ‘internal complexity and 
contradictions’ and ‘degree of technocracy’. During this phase the author also took into account 
the relationship between different codes and themes. 
 
In addition to the interviews, the author was able to observe the high-level meetings in 
Washington in 2009 and 2017. The author had a formal position as an invited non-participant 
observer. Conversations during the meetings were followed without any reference to a pre-
prepared schema; this allowed the author to act flexibly and openly within the observation 
situation. This provided some useful insights into what topics and in which way topics were 
discussed and, the interactions in the high-level meetings between different actors in the 
dialogue process.  
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Theoretical framework 
The theoretical background of this study is based on the global governance concept and 
sociological approaches to organization theory. The latter have been chosen for two reasons: 
firstly, they can help to explain organizational characteristics which have an impact on decision-
making of organizational representatives and secondly, they can help to strengthen the 
analytical dimension of the global governance concept.  
 
All global governance concepts emphasize the connection between the process of globalization 
and the issue of regulation. It has been argued elsewhere that globalization and the growing 
internationalization of economic activities has impacted negatively on the efficiency of national 
regulative institutions such as labour laws and collective bargaining (Marginson, 2016). The 
rising numbers and power of MNEs is arguably a result of the internationalization of production 
and services, the enhanced mobility of capital and the predominant paradigm of neo-liberal 
economic policies. Neo-liberal policies have been pursued to a greater extent by many national 
governments and have arguably led to increased competitive pressure between nation states and 
transnational companies and to increasing downward pressure on labour standards. In other 
words, the globalization process has arguably resulted in a ‘race to the bottom’ (Hepple, 2005: 
15; Sengenberger, 2005) with many employers exploiting a reduction in and deregulation of 
employment rights at the national level, leading to an increase in precarious work low-paid 
work in many developed countries and, raising considerable challenges for national trade 
unions (Herod and Aguiar, 2006; Katz and Krueger, 2016).  
 
Although the globalization perspective considers the sovereign nation state to be important 
(Meyer et al., 2006), challenges such as the 2008 international financial and economic crisis 
and rising income inequality cannot be overcome at the national level alone. Rather, existing 
institutions at the national level need to be supported by effective institutional arrangements at 
the international level. However, it can be argued that in addition to governance and control 
problems there is a considerable democratic deficit at the heart of the existing global governance 
system and, through which only a limited spectrum of interests is effectively represented, 
reflecting existing power asymmetries in the global economy.  
 
Until now the global governance concept has only been weakly specified and as such indicates 
neither a new theory nor an analytical category (Behrens and Reichwein, 2007). In the broadest 
sense, global governance can be defined as, ‘governing, without sovereign authority, 
relationships that transcends national frontiers’ (Finkelstein, 1995: 369). The main criticism of 
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the global governance concept is that it does not sufficiently consider the close connection 
between political and economic structures and processes, and does not provide a sufficient 
analysis of the nature of global challenges nor the power relations amongst corporate actors 
(Scherrer and Brand, 2011). Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006) distinguish between two general 
uses of the global governance concept: first as an analytical concept and second as a political 
programme. The latter can be expressed as either a normative perspective or as a critical 
perspective. Scherrer and Brand (2011) add another perspective which is the use of the global 
governance concept as descriptive category. In this context global governance describes new 
developments in international relations and stresses the importance of other spatial levels in 
addition to the national level. The former, analytical perspective focuses on the actual or 
perceived reality of world politics and the factors which determine new forms of political 
regulation. Furthermore, it considers the efficiency of mechanisms of interaction at the global 
level and its impact. Thus, global governance as an analytical concept attempts to explain a 
structure-process-impact relationship (Mayntz, 2005).  
 
The concept of global governance for the purposes of this study is oriented towards a new 
‘culture of cooperation’ which is based on a multilateral understanding of politics adjusted to 
democratic principles (Huber, 2008: 57). In this context, it can be interpreted as the initiation 
of cooperation and coherent action between global organizations towards a specified global 
problem, where each organization has different resources available and represents different 
interests. Global governance is not considered to be equal to established forms of governance 
at the national level where socially binding programmes can be decided and implemented.  
 
For the purposes of this study, the international organizations involved in the dialogue are 
described as corporate social actors. The actor status of these organizations derives from the 
expectations of other actors such as governments, individual actors and stakeholders who hold 
them responsible for their actions (King et al., 2010). As corporate social actors they have a 
clearly defined relationship with their member organizations. In particular in the case of the 
IFIs the organizations could be understood as, ‘authorized social actors and social artefacts - 
that is, social tools fashioned by founders for specific purposes’ (Whetten and Mackey, 2002: 
397). However, even though there is a certain dependency relationship with national 
governments, it does not describe the nature of the organizations within the study per se; rather 
the focus is on international organizations as ‘social actors’. This means that even though they 
do not share the same structural attributes as human actors they do have functionally equivalent 
characteristics (King et al, 2010). Social actors can take goal-oriented actions, intervene 
actively in their environment, act without the consent of their members, and can make 
intentional decisions and use resources to achieve their goals. Finally, they are also able to 
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reflect on their own actions, to learn from experiences and are to some extent accountable for 
their actions.  
 
However, although there are features which these organizations have in common, they are quite 
different in terms of the arenas in which they operate, their resources, their bureaucratic 
structure, their identity and culture and their ability to change and to adapt to environmental 
changes. So for example, the main arena for the WB is general development policy, for the IFC 
it is the support of private sector companies, for the IMF it is global financial policy and for the 
Global Unions it is workers’ interests which are paramount. These arenas determine different 
problem definitions and solutions which are the result of different political beliefs and 
ideologies.  
 
The bureaucratic structure of an organization includes different elements such as job positions, 
policies, programmes and procedures and determines the character of an organization which 
has influence over its agents. In this context different divisions of an organization create, 
‘fragmented patterns of thought and action’ which affect the flow of knowledge and 
organizational learning (Morgan, 1997: 88). Both the WB and the IMF have strong hierarchical 
divisions, and the WB also has strong horizontal divisions which limit the free flow of 
knowledge. As a result, different subunits (Morgan, 1997: 88), ‘often operate on the basis of 
different pictures of the total situation, pursuing subunit goals almost as ends in themselves’. 
The organizational structure also has an effect on decision making. Decision-making is mainly 
linked to individual actors, their cognitive limitations and preferences. In order to facilitate 
coordination among individual actors the different subunits develop programmes of activities 
or responses regards certain stimuli which facilitate search and selection processes for 
individual actors. Over time they can lead to a routinization of activities which make 
organizational learning processes more difficult. Institutionalized policies and programmes and 
the routinization of activities can hamper the cooperation between organizations and the 
development of joint positions and policies. This is because routinized activities tend to hinder 
organizational agents’ abilities to see the bigger picture. However, organizational 
representatives do not only engage in ‘routinized’ behaviour, but also in tactical and political 
behaviour which becomes expressed in ‘power-struggles, alliance-formation, strategic 
manoeuvring and ‘cut-throat’ actions’ (Schein, 1977: 64). Those individuals who seek to 
control organizational decisions and actions can be seen as ‘influencers’. Influencers have their 
own levers of power and their success in influencing and controlling decisions determines the 
‘configuration of organizational power’ (Mintzberg, 1983: 22). Intra-organizational power 
struggles form an important reality of organizational life, however, the real nature and influence 
of individual political behaviours within organizations, including the underlying intentions of 
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individual actors and the resources these actors have available, are difficult to investigate and 
reveal for those outside the organization.  
 
Power resources available to corporate social actors include the use of financial and non-
financial resources, the organizational structure and rules as well as the formal authority, the 
control of organizational knowledge and the ability to cope with uncertainty which exists within 
and outside an organization (Morgan, 1997). Differences concerning the distribution of power 
sources can lead to power asymmetries within and between corporate actors which may cause 
conflict if more powerful actors decide to exploit or try to influence weaker actors. Power also 
plays a role with regard to relations and interactions among individual actors, their relations 
and interactions with a corporate actor as well as with regard to relations and interactions among 
corporate actors. The paper argues that the dialogue can help to mitigate problems which are 
interconnected with organizational characteristics such as for example routinization.  
Furthermore, the dialogue can help to fill ‘global governance gaps’ such as knowledge and 
normative gaps (Weiss, 2011) and contribute to balancing out the unequal power relationship 
among different corporate actors within the system of global governance.  
 
How does the dialogue work? 
The Global Unions have been concerned about the negative impacts of IFI policies on workers 
for quite some time, but particularly from the 1980s onwards when the IMF and WB began 
operating within a framework of economic neo-liberalism (Stiglitz, 2008). The origins of the 
dialogue date back to the 1990s, when the predecessors of the ITUC, the ICFTU (International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions) and the WCL (World Confederation of Labour), and some 
GUFs started to discuss and criticise IFI macroeconomic policies with IFI officials. At the end 
of the 1990s meetings between the ITUC, the GUFs and the IFIs started to take place on a more 
regular basis. Around the turn of the millennium, in 2002, the Global Unions and the IFIs finally 
adopted an agreement concerning a regular and enhanced dialogue and a formalized structure 
(WB, 2002). This agreement was updated in 2013 by the ITUC, the IMF and the WB. The 2013 
framework identifies the ITUC as a ‘core trade union interlocutor’ at the multilateral level and 
reaffirms the structure of the dialogue. In addition, it stresses the importance of consultation 
between the IFIs and the labour unions on, ‘labour related issues in individual countries, 
regionally, or globally with regard to on-going and new projects, programs and policies’ 
(Framework for Dialogue, 2013: 1). 
 
The agreement adopted in 2002 defined three levels of dialogue which influence each other. At 
the HQ level, there is a dialogue between the headquarters of the ITUC and their affiliates, the 
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GUFs the WB, the IFC and the IMF (including organizational leaders, staff in high 
administrative positions and representatives of member organizations). These meetings include 
high-level meetings which take place every two years and include a large delegation from the 
Global Unions as well as a broad representation of staff from the IFIs. High-level meetings 
normally take place over three days in Washington and focus on an agenda which includes 
topics which are not specific to any particular sector. The high-level meetings are supported by 
technical meetings and interim meetings which include smaller delegations of the Global 
Unions and the IFIs. During technical meetings, which take place several times a year in 
between high level meetings (over a period of one or two days), the focus is on very specific 
issues such as pensions or labour market reforms. During interim meetings a relatively small 
group of trade unionists and IFI representatives regularly follow up the implementation of the 
commitments made at high-level and technical meetings.  
 
Although not within the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that the second level of the 
dialogue (sector-level) takes place between individual GUFs - which cover nine major sectors 
of economic activity in both the public and private sectorsi - and the WB with the objective of 
establishing an effective exchange of information on WB policies and projects in specific 
sectors. The third level of the dialogue (at the country level) includes the exchange of 
information between WB country offices and national trade union organizations and between 
IMF country mission teams and national trade unions.  
 
A definition of the dialogue 
The HQ-level dialogue may share some of the characteristics of social dialogue, such as for 
example the focus on long-term gains and the enduring political will of all parties involved to 
achieve commitments. The HQ-level dialogue also shares some characteristics of lobbying, for 
example it can be seen as a form of advocacy aimed at changing the general policy approach 
and paradigm of the IFIs. However, the dialogue also differs in several aspects from 'social 
dialogue and lobbying and for that reason it requires its own specific definition.  
 
The HQ-level dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs can be defined as an 
institutionalized communication process which takes place on a regular basis. It can be 
classified as a form of international policy dialogue which takes place between organizations 
which are active at the global policy level. The organizations involved do not act as social 
partners and do not negotiate specific agreements. Rather, this form of dialogue serves to 
exchange views, to develop a better understanding of each other’s approaches and to identify 
possible areas of cooperation.  
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From the trade union perspective, the dialogue is also about acquiring policy commitments from 
the IFIs. The dialogue between the Global Unions and the IFIs is based on the development of 
a long-term relationship between all the organizations involved and is aimed at creating more 
trust in the relationships amongst the organizational representatives. The dialogue includes 
information sharing mainly on a formal level, and to a minor extent, on an informal level. It is 
not about influencing specific decision-making processes to achieve advantages for an 
individual organization and its members; it is more holistic.  
 
The organizations involved in the dialogue – the Global Unions and the IFIs 
The Global Unions 
The Global Unions have a very large membership and clearly defined mandates which make 
them important actors at the international policy level. The ITUC has 315 members and 
represents the interests of 175 million workers across the world. Their broad membership base 
and their democratic structures provide the Global Unions with a source of power and 
legitimacy which clearly distinguishes them from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
non-profit organizations (NPOs).  
Unions remain by far the largest membership organizations in the world and have 
extensive international coverage, dwarfing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
…they are also engaged with the impact of globalisation (Croucher and Cotton, 2009: 4).  
The Global Unions have a clear and unique set of characteristics, in that they are the, ‘only 
universal and democratically organized movement at world level, with an unequalled capacity 
for resistance’ and, ‘…the only movement through which millions of workers achieve power 
through organization’ (Gallin, 2002: 250).  
 
Despite this the WB and the IMF do not officially distinguish between trade unions and other 
civil society actors. On its website, the WB states that it interacts with, ‘hundreds of Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) every day throughout the world’ but there is no specific 
mentioning of trade unions or other types of CSOs. The IMF also uses the term in a general 
way referring to, ‘…business forums, faith-based associations, labour unions, local community 
groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), philanthropic foundations, and think tanks’ 
(IMF, 2016). 
 
By comparison the ITUC considers itself as a, ‘…countervailing force in the global economy’ 
(ITUC, 2014: 8). It mainly does political work at the global level and through the Economic 
and Social Policy Department it, ‘…seeks to increase intergovernmental cooperation to ensure 
that the social dimension of globalization, including decent work and fundamental workers’ 
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rights, is right at the centre of decision-making within the world’s major global and regional 
institutions’ (ITUC website). The work of the ITUC is supported by the nine GUFs, although 
some GUFs are more heavily involved in the dialogue than others and largely depending on 
their organizational resources and individual priorities which are determined by their member 
unions at the national level.  
 
In the broadest sense each GUF is a kind of a ‘docking station’ for national trade unions (Traub-
Merz and Eckl, 2007: 5). Many GUFs deal directly with MNEs and try to ‘achieve material 
gains for their members’ (Abbott, 2011: 162). In order that the GUFs can do their work 
effectively, they rely on information from their national affiliates and regional organizations. 
The GUFs have a broad expertise regards legal and economic issues which arises from their 
practical experiences of working with and focusing on MNEs, other companies and their 
networks, International Frameworks Agreements (IFAs) and international trade union 
campaigns. GUFs aim to regularly ‘improve their knowledge of the internal dynamics of large 
corporations’ (TUAC, 2005: 14). This specific knowledge arguably gives the GUFs an initiator 
role in respect of trade union policy at the global level (Cotton and Gumbrell-McCormick, 
2012).  
 
The IFIs 
In contrast to the Global Unions, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have become 
central actors in international politics acting as ‘agents of global change’ (Carbone, 2007: 180). 
Both the WBG and the IMF have played an important role in governing the international 
economy and promoting ‘development’ since the post-World War II period (Chorev and Babb, 
2009). They were founded with the objective of providing global public goods (GPGs) for 
people across the world and to offer governments the possibility to participate in activities ‘that 
required some separation from domestic politics in order to generate legitimacy and trust’ 
(Martinez-Diaz, 2008: 7). However, since the 1980s the IFIs have mainly been concerned with 
the, ‘coercive diffusion of neoliberal economic policies’, amongst their member governments 
(Torfason and Ingram, 2010: 357).  
 
The IMF has a ‘normative’ influence on the system of global governance, in that it provides 
information about certain ‘norms’ such as ‘austerity’ and has the, ‘hands-on expertise required 
to establish structures of conformity with those norms’ (Ibid., 2010: 357). The WBs’ annual 
flagship report ‘Doing Business’ still considers labour regulations as obstacles to investment 
and growth. The latter ranks those countries with the most desirable and ‘best’ outcomes for 
businesses as those that have, ‘…the most business-friendly regulation’ (WB, 2013: 2), 
meaning that countries with a weak regulatory environment (for example Singapore) are ranked 
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highest, which clearly contradicts the idea that labour standards need to be enhanced and 
protected (WB, 2013). 
 
The general objective of the WB is to give financial and technical support to governments of 
developing countries for public sector projects. In this context, the IBRD (International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development) focuses on middle-income countries whereas the IDA 
(International Development Agency) focuses on the poorest countries worldwide. According to 
its self-definition the WB is, ‘…not a Bank in the ordinary sense, but a unique partnership to 
reduce poverty and support development’ (World Bank website, 2018ii). The Bank describes 
itself as ‘global development cooperative’ (World Bank, 2012: 14). Apart from the development 
approach the ‘bank approach’ is important in gathering financial resources. The IBRD is active 
in the global financial markets where it issues bonds and passes its low interest rates on to its 
borrowers. The WB’s stated aim is not to maximize its own profits, however, its operations on 
the international financial markets suggest a dichotomy of interest in that it is on the one hand 
a money lender and on the other hand a ‘development agency’ which, ‘wants to reduce poverty’ 
(WB01 official, 2008). This dichotomy determines the organizational values which are, on the 
one hand, market and economy oriented, and on the other hand focused on social development. 
Apart from its material resources the IBRD and the IDA have more than 10,000 members of 
staff around the world. Two-thirds of them work at WB headquarters and one-third in the more 
than 120 country offices.  
 
The IMF promotes international monetary cooperation and exchange stability (IMF, 2011). In 
comparison to the WB, the IMF does not emphasize development even though it does promote 
‘economic development’ indirectly through its financial support for countries, when such 
countries face difficulties with their balance of payments or in the context of financial crises 
(IEO, 2008). Hence, the IMF is not troubled by a dichotomy of approaches with regard to its 
mission. However, in trying to fulfil its mandate potential conflicts do arise in respect of its 
dual roles as ‘global watchdog’ and ‘trusted advisor’ (IEO, 2013: 11). 
 
In terms of fulfilling their missions the IFIs and the GUFs have over the course of time 
developed specific knowledge, organizational routines, programmes and strategies. However, 
knowledge is developed and based on certain ideological paradigms. The IFIs still follow a 
neoliberal agenda which has largely been shaped by the ‘Washington Consensus’, that is 
policies recommended by the IFIs and the US Treasury. During the 1980s and early 1990s these 
policies relied very much on ‘market fundamentalism’ and ‘entailed a much more 
circumscribed role for the state’ (Stiglitz, 2008: 46). Despite the 2008 economic crisis the IFIs 
still follow a paradigm based on free-market orthodoxy including the promotion of deregulation 
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and privatization. In comparison, the Global Unions follow a paradigm which is based on global 
social justice in line with ILO guidelines and labour standards and broader human and labour 
rights principles. 
 
The dialogue: successes and challenges 
Cooperation and successful communication within the dialogue depends to a large extent on 
the attitudes, opinions and mutual perceptions of the individual actors involved. Perceptions 
and opinions of individual actors are shaped to a large extent by the organizations which they 
represent and by the predominant organizational paradigm and values. In the case of the Global 
Unions the universally recognized values and principles comprise solidarity, democracy and 
equality (ITUC, 2010). The organizational paradigm of the Global Unions is oriented towards 
global welfare and a more equal distribution of global wealth. In contrast, the paradigm of the 
IFIs is based on capitalism and the promotion of economic development and international 
monetary cooperation. The IFIs also have explicit codes of conduct for staff which aim to guide 
the behavior of individual actors.  
 
Despite differences of perception, the interview findings and observations of the high-level 
meetings suggest that there is a wide agreement between the different organizational 
representatives involved, that all levels of the dialogue are essential and important. During the 
most recent high-level meeting in Washington in 2017, the ITUC Secretary-general described 
the WB as an, ‘increasingly robust partner’ and a WB representative stated that the cooperation 
with the unions is ‘very productive’ and that there is a move towards ‘common views as 
multilateral organizations’ (Minutes high-level meetings, 2017). However, these ‘positive’ 
statements are not necessarily reflected in respective individual and corporate behaviours and 
actions.  
 
For the ITUC, the importance of the dialogue with the IFIs is conditioned by its perspective that 
the dialogue is a ‘strategic instrument’ which they see as a mechanism to change IFIs policies. 
According to the director of the ITUC/Global Unions office, the Global Unions engage in the 
dialogue with, ‘very specific objectives of changing policy’ and not ‘for the purpose of simply 
discussing each other’s point of view’ (Interview ITUC02, 2008). The objective of achieving 
change in IFI policies has been a consistent aim of ITUC and GUF representatives who have 
been actively involved in the dialogue. The interviews revealed several factors which are 
closely related to the achievement of organizational change within the IFIs, some of which can 
be actively influenced by trade unions and their members whilst others cannot.   
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One factor which is considered to be important for the trade unions is time. It is widely 
acknowledged that a change of policy within the IFIs cannot be achieved in the short-term. 
However, according to an official of Education International (EI) in 2008 the dialogue, ‘can 
bring changes in the long term’. Time is also influential in respect of the different phases of the 
dialogue. There are times when progress is made and other times, ‘when things move more 
slowly’ (ITUC01 official, 2008). A second factor which the trade unions consider as relevant 
with regard to the achievement of change is the persistence of their demands. Independently 
from the immediate feedback that trade unions receive from IFI staff and from the output they 
achieve in the short- and medium-term, it is also important for the unions to have a constant 
voice and presence. In order to give a clear message to the WB and the IMF that unions cannot 
be ignored they need to be actively engaged in following up the policy developments of the IFIs 
and have their voices heard within the high-level meetings with the IFIs. As a PSI (Public 
Service International) official put it, ‘…look we are here, you’ve got to talk to us’.  
 
While the unions have little influence over the time required to make changes in IFI policies, 
their persistence can have an effective influence and this depends on the persistence of 
individual actors and both collective and individual resources. The former include the resources 
trade unions have available to promote certain issues and the priorities which have been set 
through the unions’ democratic decision-making processes. On the individual level, an 
important factor is the positive individual attitude towards the dialogue, the ability to deal with 
the setbacks resulting from bilateral communication with IFI staff and, making the relationship 
work. For example, according to an official from the Building and Wood Workers International 
(BWI), the organization adopts a ‘very dogmatic’ approach when dealing with staff from the 
WB procurement department and ‘nurtures that relationship’ (BWI02 official, 2017). In this 
regard the focus is on getting the attention from governments, contractors and the WB and 
achieving trade union recognition with the contracting companies. 
 
A third factor which plays into the promotion of organizational change and which has been 
mentioned by trade unionists is leadership within the IFIs (IG Metall official, 2008). Leadership 
is connected to the attitudes of specific individuals and the political will to initiate and promote 
change. Due to the fact that under normal circumstances the presidency of the WB is only for 
a five year period, it can be argued that the space the WB offers for ‘reformers’ and their ideas 
is to some extent cyclically shaped and dependent on the attitude of the WB president. Thus, a 
president who is more open to the idea of organizational reforms and responsive to trade union 
concerns creates a window of opportunity for the Global Unions in that their concerns and 
proposals are more likely to be heard. For example, James Wolfensohn who was the president 
of the Bank in 1995 pushed for an expansion of the development dialogue with civil society for 
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ten years and initiated the idea of establishing secondments for trade unionists to spend time at 
the WB. This was an important step to foster the exchange between WB staff and trade 
unionists, even though it only took place on a very limited scale (PSI official, 2008). In contrast 
to Wolfensohn, both Presidents Paul Wolfowitz (2005-2007) and Robert B. Zoellick (2007-
2012) did not have much time for trade unions (ITUC04 official, 2009; ITUC02 official, 2011). 
There is a similar situation at the IMF where some union officials feel that, ‘the personal 
openness and desire to collaborate’ with unions from the side of the current managing director 
has diminished in recent years (ITUC02 official, 2015).   
 
Representatives of the IFIs nevertheless see the dialogue with the Global Unions as important 
and many of them express positive opinions in this regard, though for them it is not about 
achieving change. For the IFIs the dialogue was and is primarily about legitimizing their own 
policies with civil society in general and in seeing trade unions as important stakeholders of 
global civil society in particular. All IFI representatives who were interviewed perceived the 
Global Unions as large and democratic membership organizations (WB01 official, 2008; 
IMF01 official, 2008). They relate these organizational characteristics with a broader 
legitimacy related to trade unions in general and perceive the organizations as representing, 
‘people with a strong interest in the economy, economic policy and economic outcomes’ 
(IMF01 official, 2008). As a result, IFI representatives, at least in terms of their rhetoric, are 
supportive of the dialogue at all its different levels including the national level where the ‘voices 
of trade unions are essential in the country’s economic dialogue’ (Ibid., 2008). During the high-
level meeting in 2017 one speaker from the IMF noted that it is critical to have the dialogue, as 
the meetings provide an opportunity to discuss issues such as economic recovery, job creation 
and labour market reforms (Minutes high-level meetings, 2017).   
 
With regard to communication processes within the dialogue it can be argued that there is not 
always a direct correlation between individual attitudes and communication, particularly with 
regard to long-term communication. In other words, positive individual attitudes do not 
necessarily lead to better communication and negative individual attitudes do not necessarily 
undermine communication between individual actors over the long term. Regards the WB for 
example, a former Executive Director stated that there has been a general, ‘openness towards 
trade unions which is not tactical, but serious’ (WB05 official, 2009). However, this general 
organizational openness which has been translated into more individual willingness to 
communicate with trade unions, does not for example, sufficiently promote labour issues as 
cross-departmental issues (Ibid., 2009). Communication on labour issues seems to be mainly 
limited to specific units such as the former Social Protection and Labour (SP&L) unit of the 
WB and its staff. However, even here the action of individuals sometimes had a negative effect. 
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For example, a former staff member of the SP&L unit showed a very positive attitude towards 
the dialogue during the interview, arguing in 2008 that in his opinion the WB has a, ‘very 
productive dialogue with trade unions and that generally speaking the dialogue with the trade 
unions is one of the best structured dialogues the WB has with civil society organizations’ 
(WB02 official, 2008). However, according to union officials his positive attitude, did not 
translate into action or the improvement of communication within the dialogue. In fact, the 
opposite was the case, according to one ITUC official, until he left his post in 2011, the same 
SP&L staff member made the exchange of information more complicated and tended to delay 
responses to requests from trade unionists. In 2014 however, the SP&L unit was integrated into 
the WB’s ‘jobs cross-cutting solution area’ and according to the same ITUC official things have 
since improved, he states that the WB’s jobs group, ‘…has been quite keen on working more 
closely’ with the trade unions (ITUC02 official, 2015). 
 
However, some IFI officials define the use and perceptions of economics and economic 
research as a major difference between the Global Unions and the IFIs. According to a WB 
official, the WB places more emphasis and use of economics as, ‘theoretical research’, even 
though there are practical implications at the country level where it is often used for policy 
advice. The same WB official stated that trade unionists generally have, ‘more of a practical 
approach’ even though unions undertake research activities in terms of economic forecasts 
(WB01 official, 2008). A former WB official interviewed in 2017, however, is quite critical 
about the use of economic methodology at the bank. The organisation is a ‘kingdom of 
economists’, which tends to focus on data and conclusions and fails to consider the processes 
on which actual outcomes depend (Interview F-WB, 2017). 
 
The fact that IFI staff assume that the unions adopt a more ‘practical’ approach can be seen as 
a kind of stereotyping and is closely related to their resources (staff). IFI staff often assume that 
all trade union organizations follow a more practical approach, because they mainly see their 
activities at the national level, above all their activities around collective bargaining. However, 
there is a growing awareness amongst IFI staff that trade unions also undertake extensive 
theoretical research and forecasts through joint organizations such as TUAC and the European 
Trade Union Institute (ETUI). During the high-level meeting in 2009, for example, the General 
Secretary of TUAC had already provided the IFIs with an economic forecast warning the IFIs 
that the economic crisis was likely to cause a dramatic increase in European unemployment in 
the same year (Minutes high-level meetings, 2009). This was largely ignored by the IMF at that 
time as they were still not focusing on the employment issue.  
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Furthermore, the interviews revealed that the dialogue partners have different expectations with 
regards to information exchange. On the one hand trade unionists usually have well defined 
expectations which are linked to their organizational objectives and pursued through the 
dialogue. On the other hand, the expectations of IFI representatives are poorly defined or not 
defined at all. IFI representatives state that over time the dialogue, particularly the HQ-level 
dialogue, has moved away from an, ‘ideological debate to a more constructive one’ (WB, 2006: 
1-2). This new ‘constructiveness’, however, seems to be little related to a better provision of 
information from IFI staff to trade unionists. On the contrary, Global Union representatives 
regularly ask for more information about planned IFI projects and programmes which concern 
workers with enough time for them to process and take a position on them (ITUC02 official, 
2008). For that reason, the constructiveness of the dialogue seems to be, as far as IFI staff are 
concerned, more related to the exchange of arguments during meetings than to the provision of 
information in between such meetings. As far as the ITUC are concerned (ITUC02 official, 
2015), the exchange of information and consultation on projects from the side of IFIs has not 
really improved, despite the amendments made to the agreement of the dialogue in 2013. 
 
During the high-level meetings the exchange of information between the IFI and Global Union 
representatives is limited due to the nature of the meetings themselves. In a relatively short 
period of three days organizational representatives discuss a broad range of topics. In order to 
facilitate a mutual understanding this kind of meeting is translated into five languages and trade 
unionists have an allocated speaking time of just three minutes (Minutes high-level meeting, 
2009). The time pressure and the amount of different issues to discuss often only allow a verbal 
expression of individual opinions and organizational positions rather than a more profound 
exchange of information and discussion. However, the high-level meetings are important in 
terms of a mutual confirmation of joint engagement in the dialogue. It also provides 
interlocutors, particularly the trade unions, with the possibility to raise awareness for specific 
issues such as for example the importance of inclusive growth and a living wage and, to repeat 
their message that collective bargaining can and should play a major role in reducing income 
inequality and, to define and initiate new areas of joint cooperation which can be further 
developed during smaller meetings. The success of the dialogue is very dependent on the 
individual actors involved on both sides, although this is ‘not how it should work’ according to 
the ITUC (ITUC02 official, 2015). In order to develop a ‘sustainable’ dialogue over the long 
term which is independent from the engagement of individual actors, the ITUC officials argue 
that they need to see a greater commitment to the dialogue from a larger number of departments 
in the IFIs, they suggest this could for example be achieved by providing staff with incentives 
to consult with trade unions on a more regular basis. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
The article contributes to the research on the Global Unions and transnational industrial 
relations focusing on the relationship between the international financial organizations (IFIs) 
and the Global Unions.  The dialogue examined in the article can be considered as a tool which 
helps trade unions to exercise their functions of articulation and participation at the global level 
allowing them to try to promote a global system of global social regulation. Until now there has 
been no systematic research undertaken on this form of dialogue. Hence, the contribution to 
knowledge of this article is twofold. First, the paper introduces a form of dialogue which has 
not been considered in the literature so far and attempts to point out some of the factors which 
promote its success and others which are perceived as challenging by the interlocutors involved 
in the dialogue. Secondly, on a theoretical level the paper makes an attempt to interlink 
organizational theories with the global governance concept in order to strengthen its analytical 
dimension. In this regard some of the organizational characteristics of the corporate actors 
which have an impact on perceptions and attitudes of individual organizational representatives 
have been highlighted. This includes for example the bureaucratic structure and the dominating 
organizational paradigm. The bureaucratic structure includes different elements such as 
positions, policies and programmes which determine the character and the degree of 
routinization of activities in organizations and which has influence over its agents in terms of 
their ability to see the bigger picture (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
 
The analysis suggests that there has been a cultural shift in the IFIs with regard to their 
understanding of engagement with civil society organizations since the dialogue was formally 
established in 2002 and there appears to have been a general increase in awareness amongst IFI 
staff with regard to labour issues since that time. However, the relationships between the Global 
Unions and the IFIs are very complex. On the one hand, the increase in awareness amongst IFI 
staff does not necessarily mean that IFI staffs regularly engage or want to engage with trade 
unions. This depends to a great extent on individual attitudes and personalities which, in turn, 
are shaped to a large extent by the organizational paradigm, the policy approaches of the 
organization within which individual actors work and the organizational expectations towards 
them.  
 
Despite their commitment to the dialogue in the protocol from 2002 and 2013, so far the IFIs 
have put no incentives or polices for staff in place which encourage individual actors to 
communicate with trade unions on a more regular basis. The lack of such policies leads to a 
rather inconsistent provision of information from IFI staff and their departments to trade unions. 
For that reason, at the high-level meetings trade union representatives consistently argue that 
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they should be properly consulted regarding the development of new programmes and the 
conditions attached to IFI loans on issues which concern labour before they are implemented. 
The Global Unions argue that is essential that their expertise contribute to the development of 
such programmes and, that the IFIs should avoid the all too many cases where Global Union 
representatives only found out about new IFI projects which concern their sectoral work when 
details were published in the media. However, the dialogue can help to develop a better mutual 
understanding among individual actors and their perceptions regards global problems and as 
such the development of joint perspectives among the different actors through dialogue is 
arguably a first important step and precondition for further cooperation regards the 
establishment of social policies at global level. 
 
As a strategic instrument the dialogue can be considered as a tool through which the Global 
Unions can have an influence over the current global logic; at least in terms of partly 
transforming this logic. However, this process is very slow and unless the dialogue is seen to 
provide concrete results for their national affiliates, Global Union organizations often find it 
difficult to ensure sufficient and continuing support from their membership. In this context, it 
is important for trade unions to make sure that the IFI’s positive sounding rhetoric is translated 
into action and to confront the IFIs with the continuing and stark contradictions between the 
policies they promote and the practical outcomes they create which are based on factual 
evidence. 
 
Overall the current situation contributes to the maintenance of the existing power asymmetries 
between the corporate actors within the dialogue, because one of the power resources which 
trade unions have, that is the mobilization of their members, is hardly available in this context. 
However, trade unions represent the largest membership organizations in the world and they 
are important stakeholders of global civil society whose legitimacy is based on democratically 
elected leadership and democratic procedures. Their legitimacy and their expert knowledge in 
the field of labour market issues defines them as an important balancing force in the system of 
global economic governance. Since the international economic and financial crisis trade 
unionists have placed even more attention to the idea of economic democracy and the idea of 
trying to ‘create new links between different levels of regulation and different issues on the 
regulatory agenda’ (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2010: 371). This focus may yet have 
an impact on the shaping of the agendas in the Global Union organizations and their affiliated 
unions and lead to a further strengthening of the dialogue as a strategic instrument for trade 
unions.  
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